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Dante’s Understanding of the Two Ends of
Human Desire and the Relationship
between Philosophy and Theology*
Jason Aleksander / Saint Xavier University
dante’s muses and the tensions between philosophy and
theology
In Dante’s poetic symbolism, there are two main beloveds who guide
and protect him. The first and most important, of course, is Beatrice,
and it is she whose love saves him and makes possible the whole journey
of his soul through the entirety of the Divine Comedy. As E´tienne Gilson
has suggested, from the standpoint of the possibility of spiritual beati-
tude, the passion for Beatrice is self-sufficient: “To give to Dante what
he expected from her, Beatrice had only to exist.”1 Indeed, Beatrice’s
very name signifies her function, a fact that may also be interpreted as
an important indication of Dante’s intention to describe the world as
if through a language in which there is no distinction between sign and
signified, between word and thing—that is, as if he were using a language
* The writing of this essay was helped greatly by my participation in a 2009 National En-
dowment for the Humanities (NEH) Summer Seminar on the Divine Comedy sponsored by
the Medieval Academy of America and supplemented by a summer grant from the Saint
Xavier University (SXU) College of Arts and Sciences. I would therefore like to acknowledge
my gratitude to the NEH, the Medieval Academy, and SXU for providing me with the op-
portunity to participate in the seminar. I would also like to express my gratitude to all of
those who participated in the seminar with me. Special words of thanks in this regard are
owed to Chris Kleinhenz, the director of the seminar, and Dolly Webber, who both provided
valuable feedback on the essay. Also, because the essay elaborates on research originally
included in my PhD dissertation, I would like to acknowledge my gratitude for the input of
my dissertation committee: John Stuhr, John Compton, Richard Lee, and especially my dis-
sertation director, Idit Dobbs-Weinstein, and first reader, Gregg Horowitz. Finally, I would
like to acknowledge my gratitude to Scott Aikin and Jennifer Holt, who also read and com-
mented on early drafts of this essay.
1 E´tienne Gilson, Dante and Philosophy, trans. David Moore (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith,
1968), 61 (hereafter cited parenthetically).
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perfectly equipped to describe the world as created imago dei or as word
made flesh.2
Dante’s other beloved—la donna gentile—is less well known even
though she is mentioned explicitly in two of his earlier works. The first
of these works, La vita nuova, was completed around 1294, just a few
years prior to the period in which Dante began to become involved in
the political conflicts in Florence that later resulted in his permanent
exile from the city of his birth. In this work, he introduces la donna
gentile as follows: “Sometime afterward, when I happened to be in a
place which recalled past times, I was in a very pensive mood, and I was
moved by such painful thoughts that I must have had a frightening
expression of distress on my face. Becoming aware of my terrible con-
dition, I looked around to see if anyone were watching me. And I saw
at a window a gracious lady [una gentile donna], young and exceedingly
beautiful, who was looking down at me so compassionately, to judge
from her appearance, that all pity seemed to be concentrated in her.”3
In the subsequent chapters of La vita nuova, Dante represents his
attachment to this woman ambivalently. He suggests that, despite her
beauty and the consolation she seems to offer, his desire for her pity is
“base” and contrary to reason and that, as a consequence, this desire
threatens his more proper devotion to Beatrice: “The sight of this lady
had now brought me to the point that my eyes began to enjoy the sight
of her too much; I often became angry at myself because of it, and I
2 Although vigorously debated in the commentaries on the Commedia, the terzina most directly
associated with this claim is Purgatorio (Purg.) 24.52–54: “I’ mi son un che, quando / Amor me
spira, noto, e a quel modo / ch’e’ ditta dentro vo significando.” References to the Divina
Commedia follow the Edizione Nazionale sponsored by the Societa` Dantesca Italiana, ed. Gior-
gio Petrocchi (Milan: Mondadori, 1966–67); this edition can be found online at both the
Dartmouth (http://dante.dartmouth.edu/) and Princeton (http://etcweb.princeton.edu/
dante/index.html) Dante Project Web sites. Translations are my own. See also Monarchia
(Mon.) 3.4.11: “Although there are many who record the divine word, it is God alone who
dictates, deigning to reveal his pleasure to us through the pens of many men” (Nam quanquam
scribe divini eloquii multi sint, unicus tamen dictator est Deus, qui beneplacitum suum nobis
per multorum calamos explicare dignitatus est). For Monarchia, references to the Latin are
from Prue Shaw’s edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Translations are
also Shaw’s.
3 “Poi per alquanto tempo, con cio` fosse cosa che io fosse in parte ne la quale mi ricordava
del passato tempo, molto stava pensoso, e con dolorosi pensamenti, tanto che mi faceano
parere de fore una vista di terribile sbigottimento. Onde io, accorgendomi del mio travagliare,
levai li occhi per vedere se altri mi vedesse. Allora vidi una gentile donna giovane e bella
molto, la quale da una finestra mi riguardava sı` pietosamente, quanto a la vista, che tutta la
pieta` parea in lei accolta” (La vita nuova [VN] 35.1–2). For La vita nuova, references to the
Italian are to the Opere minori, vol. 1, ed. Domenico De Robertis and Gianfranco Contini
(Milan: Riccardo Ricciardi, 1995). Translations are those of Mark Musa (Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 1973); this edition can also be found at the Princeton Dante Project Web
site.
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felt I was very contemptible.”4 And “then I began to think about her
and, remembering her in the sequence of past times, my heart began
to repent painfully of the desire by which it so basely let itself be pos-
sessed for some time, contrary to the constancy of reason; and once I
had discarded this evil desire, all my thoughts turned back to their most
gracious Beatrice.”5 In short, in La vita nuova, the love of la donna gentile
seems to provide a consolation for the loss of Beatrice, but this love is
depicted as a base passion because it is immoderate and supplants the
respect that is owed to Beatrice and therefore also supplants the aims
of both reason and faith.
Evidently something changed for Dante subsequent to his exile from
Florence. In Convivio, his first philosophical treatise—begun around
1304 and abandoned around 1307—la donna gentile makes another ap-
pearance, but this time as a personification of philosophy—in fact, as
an invocation of Boethius’s Lady Philosophy.6 This version of la donna
gentile is praised without ambivalence as “the daughter of God, queen
of all things, most noble and beautiful,”7 and she signifies “an intellec-
tual soul both noble and free in the exercise of the power proper to it,
which is reason.”8 As in La vita nuova, she is still described as a con-
solation for the loss of Beatrice, but in this case, such a consolation
does not appear to present the same spiritual or moral risks that de-
votion to her posed in the situation described in the earlier work. In
fact, in Convivio, Dante appears to suggest that devotion to la donna
4 “Lo venni a tanto per la vista di questa donna, che li miei occhi si cominciaro a dilettare
troppo di vederla; onde molte volte me ne crucciava nel mio cuore ed aveamene per vile
assai” (VN 37.1).
5 “Allora cominciai a pensare di lei; e ricordandomi di lei secondo l’ordine del tempo
passato, lo mio cuore comincio` dolorosamente a pentere de lo desiderio a cui sı` vilmente
s’avea lasciato possedere alquanti die contra la costanzia de la ragione: e discacciato questo
cotale malvagio desiderio, sı` si rivolsero tutti li miei pensamenti a la loro gentilissima Beatrice”
(VN 39.2).
6 In both La vita nuova and Convivio (Conv.), but especially the latter, Dante draws explicitly
on Boethius in discussing the notion of philosophy as “consolation” (see, e.g., Conv. 2.12.2).
For a discussion of Dante’s invocation of Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy, see Olivia Holmes,
Dante’s Two Beloveds (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), esp. 35–67.
7 “Figlia di Dio, regina di tutto, nobilissima e bellissima Filosfia” (Conv. 2.12.9). Italian
references to Convivio follow the Edizione Nazionale sponsored by the Societa` Dantesca It-
aliana, ed. Franca Brambilla Ageno (Florence: Le Lettere, 1995); this edition can be found
online at the Princeton Dante Project Web site. The English translation is that of Richard
Lansing (New York: Garland, 1990); this translation can also be found online at the Princeton
Dante Project Web site. Christopher Ryan has also offered an excellent translation of the
Convivio in Dante: The Banquet (Saratoga, CA: Stanford French and Italian Studies, Amna Libri,
1989). Unfortunately, because this version is not widely available, it is rarely cited in Dante
scholarship.
8 “Per donna gentile s’intende la nobile anima d’ingegno, e libera nella sua propia potestate,
che e` la ragione” (Conv. 3.14.9).
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gentile sustains the devotion that is also owed to Beatrice. In the last
lines of the third stanza of Convivio’s second canzone, for instance,
Dante writes that, with respect to la donna gentile,
Gentile e` in donna cio` che in lei si trova,
e bello e` tanto quanto lei simiglia.
E puossi dir che ’l suo aspetto giova
a consentir cio` che par maraviglia;
onde la nostra fede e` aiutata:
pero` fu tal da etterno ordinata.9
Thus, while La vita nuova suggests that love of la donna gentile is a dan-
gerous consolation that imperils Dante’s soul, the argument of Convivio
is that love of la donna gentile, as the love of philosophy, aids his faith
by helping him appreciate the beauty of divine providence.
According to many commentators on the Divine Comedy, Dante intro-
duces a further complication for interpreters of the relationship be-
tween la donna gentile and Beatrice in Purgatorio 30 and 31, where Be-
atrice herself seems to rebuke the pilgrim for his attachment to la donna
gentile. In canto 30, for instance, Beatrice says,
“Sı` tosto come in su la soglia fui
di mia seconda etade e mutai vita,
questi si tolse a me, e diessi altrui.
Quando di carne a spirto era salita,
e bellezza e virtu` cresciuta m’era,
fu’ io a lui men cara e men gradita;
e volse i passi suoi per via non vera,
imagini di ben seguendo false,
che nulla promession rendono intera.”10
It should not come as a surprise that the apparent contradiction be-
tween these three depictions of the relationships or tensions between
these two symbolic objects of devotion—one of which is regularly as-
sociated with philosophy and the other of which is associated with the-
9 “Gentle is in woman what is found in her, / What most resembles her is beauty. / And
we may say her countenance helps us / Regard as true what seems a miracle, / By which our
faith is fortified: / For this she was ordained by eternity” (Conv. 3, second canzone, lines 49–
54).
10 “Once I had reached the threshold of my second age and had changed lives, he took
himself from me and gave himself to others. When I had risen from flesh to spirit, and beauty
and virtue had increased in me, I was less dear and less pleasing to him; and he turned his
steps upon a way not true, following false images of good that fulfill no promise” (Purg.
30.124–32).
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ology—has been the source of a good deal of academic consternation.11
But, before wading into this thicket, I hope to shed light on Dante’s
understanding of the relationship between theology and philosophy by
turning to his underlying philosophical conceptions of human psy-
chology and the way in which it grounds a conception of dual authority
in relationship to which Dante understands both philosophy and the-
ology to be indispensible.
the two ends of human desire and philosophy’s earthly
authority
So, setting aside for the moment the poetic depictions of these two
beloveds, it is possible to begin again with this: the fundamental phil-
osophical recognition that grounds Dante’s thought in all of its other
manifestations—religious, political, poetic, and so on—is that, as he puts
it in the last chapter of his most important and sustained discussion of
political philosophy, the Monarchia, the human being, “alone among all
beings is ordered [by] two ultimate goals, one of them being his goal
as a corruptible being, the other his goal as an incorruptible being.”12
Indeed, this principle grounds what Dante calls an “ostensive proof” of
the independence of temporal and spiritual authorities:
Ineffable providence has thus set before us two goals to aim at: i.e., happiness
[beatitudo] in this life, which consists in the exercise of our own powers and is
figured in the earthly paradise; and happiness [beatitudo] in the eternal life,
which consists in the enjoyment of the vision of God (to which our own powers
cannot raise us except with the help of God’s light). . . . We attain the first
through the teachings of philosophy, provided that we follow them putting into
11 See Edward Moore, “The Reproaches of Beatrice,” in Studies in Dante, 3rd ser., Miscellaneous
Essays (1903; Oxford: Clarendon, 1968), 221–52. For a view interpreting Dante as never having
abandoned a predilection for philosophy, see Michele Barbi, Problemi di critica dantesca: Seconda
serie (Florence: Sansoni, 1941); Peter Dronke, Dante’s Second Love: The Originality and the Contexts
of the “Convivio” (Exeter: Society for Italian Studies, 1997); and John A. Scott, “Beatrice’s
Reproaches in Eden: Which ‘School’ Had Dante Followed?” Dante Studies 109 (1991): 8–9,
“The Unfinished Convivio as Pathway to the Comedy,” Dante Studies 113 (1995): 31–56, Dante’s
Political Purgatory (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), esp. 179–211, and
Understanding Dante (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2004). For the view that
Dante is reproaching a youthful attachment to philosophy (especially as a reproach against
the Convivio), see John Freccero, “Casella’s Song,” in Dante: The Poetics of Conversion, ed. Rachel
Jacoff (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 186–94; Robert Hollander, “Purgatorio
II: Cato’s Rebuke and Dante’s scoglio,” Italica 52 (1975): 348–63, and “Purgatorio II: The New
Song and the Old,” Lectura Dantis 6 (1990): 28–45; Rachel Jacoff, “The Post-Palinodic Smile:
Paradiso VIII and IX,” Dante Studies 98 (1980): 111–22; and Teodolinda Barolini, Dante’s Poets
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).
12 “Solus inter omnia entia in duo ultima ordinetur, quorum alterum sit finis eius prout
corruptibilis est, alterum vero prout incorruptibilis” (Mon. 3.16.6), my emendation.
Dante and the Relationship between Philosophy and Theology
163
practice the moral and intellectual virtues; whereas we attain the second through
spiritual teachings, which transcend human reason, provided that we follow
them putting into practice the theological virtues, i.e., faith, hope, and charity.
. . . It is for this reason that man had need of two guides corresponding to his
twofold goal: that is to say the supreme Pontiff, to lead mankind to eternal life
in conformity with revealed truth, and the emperor, to guide mankind to tem-
poral happiness [felicitas] in conformity with the teachings of philosophy.13
To the extent that Dante does maintain the independence of philos-
ophy and theology (as well as that of temporal and spiritual authority),
this independence is founded on Dante’s understanding of the dual
ends of human existence—that is, its temporal and spiritual beatitudes.
In this Dante’s thought is indebted to an interpretation of Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics. With Aristotle, Dante argues that, in the strictest
sense, philosophy’s authority with respect to the perfection of man qua
man does not pertain to contemplative aims but only to philosophy’s
guiding capacity with respect to practical ends. But with respect to con-
templative aims, Dante’s argument also depends upon an interpretation
of the Nicomachean Ethics in that Dante agrees with Aristotle that, to the
extent that contemplation serves a human perfection, it does not serve
a perfection of man qua man but rather a perfection that relates only
to what is divine in man.14 However, in his articulation of the indepen-
dence of philosophy’s and theology’s respective authorities in human
affairs, Dante’s thought involves commitments that depart significantly
from Aristotle’s.
13 “Duos igitur fines providentia illa inenarrabilis homini proposuit intendendos: beatitu-
dinem scilicet huius vite, que, in operatione proprie virtutis consistit et per terrestrem par-
adisum figuratur; et beatitudinem vite ecterne, que consistit in fruitione divini aspectus ad
quam propria virtus ascendere non potest, nisi lumine divino adiuta, que per paradisum
celestem intelligi datur. . . . Nam ad primam per phylosophica documenta venimus, dum-
modo illa sequamur secundum virtutes morales et intellectuales operando; ad secundam vero
per documenta spiritualia que humanam rationem transcendunt, dummodo illa sequamur
secundum virtutes theologicas operando, fidem spem scilicet et karitatem. . . . Propter quod
opus fuit homini duplici directivo secundum duplicem finem: scilicet summo Pontifice, qui
secundum revelata humanum genus perduceret ad vitam ecternam, et Imperatore, qui se-
cundum phylosophica documenta genus humanum ad temporalem felicitatem dirigeret”
(Mon. 3.16.7–10). Dante makes no consistent distinction between the terms beatitudo and
felicitas when describing the two forms of happiness, though he does tend to use beatitudo
more frequently than felicitas to describe either form of happiness. In this article, I generally
refer to spiritual happiness as primary or spiritual beatitude and earthly happiness as secondary
or temporal beatitude.
14 See esp. Conv. 2.4 and 4.22. Aristotle puts it this way: “Such a life, of course, would be
above that of a man, for a man will live in this manner not insofar as he is a man, but insofar
as he has something divine in him; and the activity of this divine part of the soul is much
superior to that of the other kind of virtue as that divine part is superior to the composite
soul of a man. So since the intellect is divine relative to a man, the life according to this
intellect, too, will be divine relative to human life” (Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Hippocrates
Apostle [Grinnell, IA: Peripatetic, 1975], K.7, 1177b26–32).
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With Aristotle, Dante maintains that contemplation is of things uni-
versal and eternal rather than of things temporal and changing and
that the objects of contemplation often exceed the natural human ca-
pacity to know. And in Convivio 4, Dante even concedes that “We must
know, however, that we may have two kinds of happiness in this life,
according to two different paths, one good and the other best, which
lead us there. One is the active life, the other the contemplative life;
and although by the active, as has been said, we may arrive at a happiness
that is good, the other leads us to the best happiness and state of bliss,
as the Philosopher proves in the tenth book of the Ethics.”15
However, both Dante’s understanding of contemplation and his cos-
mology concerning the nature of eternal things also differ from Aris-
totle’s. In the context of the present discussion, then, more than Dante’s
aforementioned insistence that the highest human beatitude depends
on grace and attention to the theological virtues, the most philosoph-
ically significant aspect of his departure from Aristotle turns out to be
his devaluation of both the power of contemplation as well as his per-
vasive emphasis on its ineffectiveness in producing either temporal or
spiritual beatitudes. As Gilson has put it, for Dante, “The intellect of
the contemplative man is indeed his intellect, but it is an intellect too
feeble to attain its object without the divine light of Revelation that
transcends it. That is why, in Dante as in Aristotle, the contemplative
life is less human than the divine, but for a reason quite different from
that which forms the basis of Aristotle’s thesis” (138).
Dante’s view in this regard is explicitly stated, for instance, in Conv.
3.15, where he insists that the highest objects of contemplation “over-
whelm our intellect . . . insofar as certain things are affirmed to exist
which our intellect cannot perceive (namely God, eternity, and primal
matter)”; accordingly, while they are certainly known to exist and “with
full faith believed to exist,” we cannot understand them.16 Moreover,
Dante also maintains in this section of the Convivio that humans do not
have a natural desire to know the causes of the very things that Aristotle
15 “Veramente e` da sapere che noi potemo avere in questa vita due felicitadi, secondo due
diversi cammini, buono e ottimo, che a cio` ne menano: l’uno e` la vita attiva, e l’altro la
contemplativa; la quale, avegna che per l’attiva si pervegna, come detto e`, a buona felicitade,
ne mena ad ottima felicitade e beatitudine, secondo che pruova lo Filosofo nel decimo
dell’Etica” (Conv. 4.17.9).
16 “Poi, quando si dice: Elle soverchian lo nostro intelletto, escuso me di cio`, che poco
parlar posso di quelle per la loro soperchianza. Dove e` da sapere che in alcuno modo queste
cose nostro intelletto abbagliano, in quanto certe cose [si] affermano essere, che lo ’ntelletto
nostro guardare non puo`, cioe` Dio e la etternitate e la prima materia: che certissimamente
si veggiono e con tutta fede si credono essere, e pur quello che sono intender noi non
potemo, se non cose negando si puo` apressare alla sua conoscenza, e non altrimenti” (Conv.
3.15.6).
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insists engender wonder and are the focus of the wise person’s attention.
That is, Dante also argues that attaining temporal beatitude does not
even require contemplation of eternal things:
Natural desire within all things is proportionate to the capacity within that thing
which has desire; otherwise desire would run counter to itself, which is impos-
sible, and nature would have created it in vain, which is likewise impossible.
. . . Therefore human desire within this life is proportionate to the wisdom
which can be acquired here, and this limit is not transgressed except through
an error which lies outside of Nature’s intention. . . . This is why, since it is
not within the power of our nature to know what God is (and what certain other
things are), we do not by nature desire to have this knowledge.17
This devaluation of the importance of contemplation suggests that
for Dante, the quintessentially Aristotelian emphasis on the relationship
between wisdom and wonder (cf. esp. Metaphysics a.2) is turned away
from the activity of philosophical contemplation toward activities as-
sociated with the cultivation of the theological virtues.18 Perhaps this
also explains a variety of parodies of contemplation in the Commedia as
well as more overt statements extolling quasi-mystical activities of ori-
entation toward theological virtues over (and perhaps even in opposi-
tion to) the empirico-intellective activities that Aristotle explicitly as-
sociates with even the most theoretical habits. In the case of parodies
17 “Lo desiderio naturale in ciascuna cosa e` misurato secondo la possibilitade della cosa
desiderante: altrimenti anderebbe in contrario di se medesimo, che impossibile e`; e la Natura
l’averebbe fatto indarno, che e` anche impossibile. . . . E pero` l’umano desiderio e` misurato
in questa vita a quella scienza che qui avere si puo`, e quello punto non passa se non per
errore, lo quale e` di fuori di naturale intenzione. . . . Onde, con cio` sia cosa che conoscere
di Dio, e di certe altre cose, quello esso e`, non sia possibile alla nostra natura, quello da noi
naturalmente non e` desiderato di sapere” (Conv. 3.15.8–10). As many commentators have
noted, Thomas offers a similar view in Summa theologica I,2,1, I,62,1, I,75,6 and Summa contra
gentiles II,55. It must also be noted, though, that Dante and Thomas are both distorting
Aristotle’s view (cf. De caelo 1.4, 271a33 and De anima 3.9, 432b21).
18 An alternative interpretation of Dante’s attitude toward contemplation is raised in some
commentaries on the allegorical significance of the seven notable stars that appear in the
skies over the Mount Purgatory (see Purg. 1.22–27, 8.88–93, 29.121–32, and 31.103–17). Com-
mentators on the Commedia unanimously interpret the three of these stars that rise at night
as representations of the three theological virtues, but some commentators also claim that
the fact that these three appear at night suggests that they are associated with contemplation,
whereas the four stars that represent the cardinal virtues and rise at dawn are associated with
the active life as opposed to the contemplative. This interpretation is not fundamentally
opposed to the one I have offered above, for it regards the purpose of contemplation not
to be knowledge of causes but rather orientation of the human soul (especially in a navi-
gational sense) toward the theological virtues. Moreover, that “contemplation” occurs at
night—the time of dreams—also illustrates, once again, the mystical aspects of Dante’s
thought—divine visions—rather than Aristotle’s own attitude toward contemplation. See, e.g.,
Conv. 2.8.13 for Dante’s discussion of why “vedemo continua esperienza della nostra immor-
talitade nelle divinazioni de’ nostri sogni.”
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of the contemplative activity, commentators have frequently pointed to
the example of Belacqua in Purgatorio 4:
“O dolce segnor mio,” diss’ io, “adocchia
colui che mostra se´ piu` negligente
che se Pigrizia fosse sua serocchia.”
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Li atti suoi pigri e le corte parole
mosser le labbra mie un poco a riso;
poi cominciai: “Belacqua, a me non dole
di te omai; ma dimmi: perche´ assiso
quiritto se’? attendi tu iscorta,
o pur lo modo usato t’ha’ ripriso?”19
But in the canto preceding the one in which Belacqua is introduced,
Virgil provides a much more explicit, albeit tragically tinged statement
about the relative insignificance of purely speculative activities that con-
curs with the view of the Convivio:
“Matto e` chi spera che nostra ragione
possa trascorrer la infinita via
che tiene una sustanza in tre persone.
State contenti, umana gente, al quia;
che´, se potuto aveste veder tutto,
mestier non era parturir Maria;
e disı¨ar vedeste sanza frutto
tai che sarebbe lor disio quetato,
ch’etternalmente e` dato lor per lutto:
io dico d’Aristotile e di Plato
e di molt’ altri”; e qui chino` la fronte,
e piu` non disse, e rimase turbato.20
Equal to the significance of Virgil’s troubled recognition of the lim-
itations of the natural light of reason is certainly a passage in Paradiso
19 “‘Oh my sweet lord,’ said I, ‘look at him. He shows himself more negligent than if Laziness
were his sister.’. . . His lazy movements and curt speech slowly made my lips smile a little; I
commenced: ‘Belaqua, I no longer need to grieve for you; but tell me: why are you sitting
here? Are you waiting for an escort, or have you reprised your old ways?’” (Purg. 4.109–11,
121–26).
20 “‘He is mad who hopes that our reason can traverse the infinite way that is taken by one
substance in three persons. Be content, human people, with the quia; for if you had been
able to see everything, there would have been no need for Mary to give birth; and you have
seen the fruitless desiring of those whose desire would [otherwise] have been fulfilled [but]
which is [now] given to them eternally for their grief. I speak of Aristotle and of Plato and
of many others;’ and he bent his brow, and said no more, and remained troubled” (Purg.
3.34–45).
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(Par.) 21 that is initiated when the pilgrim asks Saint Peter Damian to
explain what has predestined him to be the bearer of celestial greetings
in the sphere of Saturn. In response, Peter Damian instructs the pilgrim
that the abyss of divine law is so deep that even the most enlightened
of the created intellects cannot comprehend an answer to this question:
“Ma quell’ alma nel ciel che piu` si schiara,
quel serafin che ’n Dio piu` l’occhio ha fisso,
a la dimanda tua non satisfara,
pero` che sı` s’innoltra ne lo abisso
de l’etterno statuto quel che chiedi,
che da ogne creata vista e` scisso.”21
Thus, although in Paradiso Dante provides many descriptions of angels
and the souls of the saved as being in a rapturous state of contemplation,
contemplation is not especially important for producing or attaining
either of the two ends of human desire. In short, while Dante may have
accepted Aristotle’s statement that “the activity of a god, then, which
surpasses all other activities in blessedness, would be contemplative,”22
he nonetheless also seems to maintain that contemplation is neither
self-sufficient with respect to earthly ends of human activity nor is it
even possible for us to derive benefit from it without risking severe moral
failure. Or, put another way, Dante recognizes and makes significant for
us that, although contemplation is indeed the noblest of activities, it is
one that is only appropriate for those who exist in a celestial state,
namely, gods, angels, and those who have been saved—those who, it
should be noted, also cannot die and so do not have to worry about
what might happen afterward.
Despite the feebleness of human intellect with respect to any capacity
to understand the divine will, Dante does not at all insist that intellectual
activity is devoid of purpose. Even though Dante devalues contemplative
activity, he maintains a partial obedience to Aristotle in his very argu-
ment against the importance of the activity that Aristotle praises most
highly. That is, even in the moment in which Dante disagrees most
fundamentally with Aristotle, he does so in a way that emphasizes his
fundamental agreement with Aristotle on another issue. Specifically, by
implicitly undermining Aristotle’s insistence on the value of theoretical
activity in the last book of Nicomachean Ethics, Dante instead emphasizes
the definition of happiness in its first book by highlighting Aristotle’s
21 “‘But even the most enlightened in heaven, that seraph whose eye is most fixed on God,
could not satisfy your question, for that is hidden in the abyss of the eternal statute from
which every creature’s vision is cut off’” (Par. 21.91–96).
22 Nicomachean Ethics K.8, 1178b22–23; see also Metaphysics a.2 982b29–983a11.
The Journal of Religion
168
emphasis on philosophy’s role in a life that consists in activity in ac-
cordance with virtue.23 In short, for Dante, wisdom, “the body of phi-
losophy,” results from the proper ordering of earthly desires or, in other
words, “from the order among the moral virtues.”24
This view, in fact, is fully corroborated in Paradiso. For instance, in
Thomas Aquinas’s descriptions of the twelve lights that encircle Beatrice
in the sphere of the sun, King Solomon is singled out as the wisest of
all procreated human intellects:
“La quinta luce, ch’e` tra noi piu` bella,
spira di tale amor, che tutto ’l mondo
la` giu` ne gola di saper novella:
entro v’e` l’alta mente u’ sı` profondo
saver fu messo, che, se ’l vero e` vero
a veder tanto non surse il secondo.”25
Recognizing, however, that the pilgrim is confused by this praise of
Solomon, Thomas adds in canto 13 that human nature was never so
perfect as in Adam and Christ since their souls were created directly by
God rather than through temporal procreation. And yet, when describ-
ing Solomon’s wisdom as ranking only behind that of these other two,
Dante, through Thomas, makes clear that it is not wisdom according to
Aristotle’s understanding of sophia26 that distinguishes Solomon, but
23 “Happiness is a certain kind of activity of the soul according to virtue” (Nicomachean Ethics
A.10, 1099b26–27). Such a reading perhaps misses Aristotle’s own insistence that theoria is an
activity, but Dante seems to read the view in book A as endorsing practical activities rather
than contemplative ones.
24 “Dove e` da sapere che la moralitade e` bellezza della Filosofia: che´ cosı` come la bellezza
del corpo resulta dalle membra in quanto sono debitamente ordinate, cosı` la bellezza della
sapienza, che e` corpo di Filosofia come detto e`, resulta dall’ordine delle vertudi morali, che
fanno quella piacere sensibilemente” (Conv. 3.15.11). Moreover, as Conv. 2.14 makes clear,
for Dante it is moral philosophy that directs the proper ordering of the other sciences and
determines their rank and value with respect to the proper ends of human action.
25 “‘The fifth light, that is among us the most beautiful, breathes forth such love that all
the world below hungers for news of it; in this light is a high mind, which such profound
wisdom was placed that, if truth is true, to this vision there never arose a second’” (Par.
10.109–14). As commentators have noted, the reason for the world’s curiosity about Solomon’s
fate may be tied to his reputation for licentiousness. That Dante has Thomas praise Solomon
so highly then makes all the more significant the passages that are quoted below from Par.
13. It is also worth noting that, despite the fact that Solomon is praised most highly in this
canto, he receives only two terzine compared with the three (a number that is almost always
significant in Dante’s poetry) offered in the description of Boethius in lines 121–29.
26 “It is clear that wisdom is scientific knowledge and intuition of the objects which are
most honorable by their nature. It is in view of this that Anaxagoras and Thales and others
like them, who are seen to ignore what is expedient to themselves, are called ‘wise’ but not
‘prudent’; and they are said to have understanding of things which are great and admirable
and difficult to know and divine but which are not instrumental for other things, for they
do not seek human goods” (Nicomachean Ethics Z.7, 1141b2–7).
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“regal prudence.” Indeed, Thomas’s ironic invocation of scholastic top-
ics in this passage highlights the point beautifully:
“Non ho parlato sı`, che tu non posse
ben veder ch’el fu re, che chiese senno
accio` che re sufficı¨ente fosse;
non per sapere il numero in che enno
li motor di qua su`, o se necesse
con contingente mai necesse fenno;
non si est dare primum motum esse,
o se del mezzo cerchio far si puote
trı¨angol sı` ch’un retto non avesse.
Onde, se cio` ch’io dissi e questo note,
regal prudenza e` quel vedere impari
in che lo stral di mia intenzion percuote.”27
In short, for Dante, sophia, the highest of the habits of true thinking
according to Aristotle and the root of the Italian term filosofia, is refig-
ured as being esteemed for its practical value rather than, as Aristotle
would have it, because the contemplative activity associated with it in
the highest degree is loved for its own sake.28 Thus, Solomon’s regal
prudence and his capacity for thoughtful rule aimed at practical con-
siderations is the precise reversal of Dante’s depiction of Ulysses’s vain
curiosity and its deplorable consequences for himself and his crew (see
Inferno [Inf.] 26). This is also perhaps why, even if Dante tends to rate
justice as the highest of the cardinal virtues in other texts (e.g., Conv.
1.12.9), in Purg. 29.130–32 he depicts the nymphs associated with justice,
fortitude, and temperance as following the modo of the one associated
with prudence.29
27 “‘I did not speak to prevent you from seeing that it was as a king that he asked for wisdom
that would be sufficient for a king; not for knowing the number of the angels above, nor if
necesse with a contingent ever made necesse; nor si est dare primum motum esse, nor if in a semicircle
a triangle having no right angle can be formed. Therefore, if you note what I said and this,
regal prudence is this matchless vision that the arrow of my intention strikes’” (Par. 13.94–
105). For Dante’s explicit confirmation of this reading, see Conv. 4.27.6.
28 “Clearly, then, we do not seek this science for any other need; but just as a man is said
to be free if he exists for his own sake and not for the sake of somebody else, so this alone
of all the sciences is free, for only this science exists for its own sake” (Metaphysics, trans.
Hippocrates Apostle [Grinnell, IA: Peripatetic, 1966], a.2 25–28). See also Nicomachean Ethics
K.7.
29 It is worth noting that “al modo” in this terzina may be literally understood as “in the
manner of,” though it is often translated in a way that highlights the musical connotation
supplied by the context, e.g., as “melody” (Durling) or “cadence” (Mandelbaum and Hol-
lander). Commentaries on this terzina often suggest that the purple clothing (porpore vestite)
of these nymphs signifies not only their regal status but also a tinge of deep red that suggests
infusion by charity—in relation to which the commentators also often cite Thomas, Summa
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Thus, in light of the fact that Dante refigures the wisdom of philos-
ophy as prudence, it becomes clear why, with the exception of Limbo,
one constantly encounters souls in Hell who, by failing to accept the
guidance of philosophy, pursue base desires that result in a moral blind-
ness that destroys the good of the intellect (cf. Inf. 3.18). In their al-
legorical significance, these encounters accord with the view offered in
the Convivio:
Here it should be observed that a wicked man may truly be said to be dead,
and above all he who strays from the path of his good ancestor. This may be
demonstrated as follows. As Aristotle says in the second book of On the Soul,
“life is the state of being of living things”; and since life exists in many degrees
(as in plants, vegetation; in animals, vegetation, sensation, and movement; in
man, vegetation, sensation, movement, and reasoning or intelligence), and
things must be named from their noblest part, it is evident that in animals life
is sensation—I mean the brutes—and in man it is the use of reason. Therefore
if such is the life and state of man’s being, to abandon one’s use of reason is
to abandon one’s state of being, which is the same as to be dead. And does a
man not abandon his reason when he does not reflect upon the end of his life?
Does a man not abandon his reason when he does not reflect upon the path
which he must take?30
In fact, Dante punctuates this understanding in Inf. 33.121–47 by
theologica I–II,65,2. More significant to the conclusion I will be offering below, prudence is
described as having three eyes, which commentators have suggested means she can see the
past, present, and future. It may also suggest, however, that she can see the way to the
theological virtues, and, in this context, even though la donna gentile is never described as
having three eyes, this interpretation would corroborate not only descriptions of prudence
noted by commentators in Conv. 4.17.8 and 4.27.4 but also those in which Dante says that
the eyes of la donna gentile reveal some of the delights of Paradise (see., e.g., Conv. 2.15.4,
3.8.5–9, and 3.15.2–5).
30 “Onde e` da sapere che veramente morto lo malvagio uomo dire si puote, e massimamente
quelli che dalla via del buono suo antecessore si parte. E cio` si puo` cosı` mostrare. Sı` come
dice Aristotile nel secondo dell’Anima, ‘vivere e` l’essere delli viventi’; e per cio` che vivere e`
per molti modi (sı` come nelle piante vegetare, nelli animali vegetare e sentire e muovere,
nelli uomini vegetare, sentire, muovere e ragionare o vero intelligere), e le cose si deono
denominare dalla piu` nobile parte, manifesto e` che vivere nelli animali e` sentire—animali,
dico, bruti—vivere nell’uomo e` ragione usare. Dunque, se vivere e` l’essere [delli viventi, e
vivere nell’uomo e` ragione usare, ragione usare e` l’essere] dell’uomo, e cosı` da quello uso
partire e` partire da essere, e cosı` e` essere morto. E non si parte dall’uso del ragionare chi
non ragiona lo fine della sua vita? e non si parte dall’uso della ragione chi non ragiona lo
cammino che far dee?” (Conv. 4.7.10–12). A similar point is also made in Conv. 3.15.17: “O
worse than dead are you who flee her friendship” (O peggio che morti che l’amista` di costei
fuggite). It may be said, then, that those in Hell, excepting the souls in Limbo, are eternally
doomed not for any specific sins for which they may have repented, but because their ethical
depravity has entirely deprived them of any rational capacity through which they might
acknowledge even the need to repent.
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exploiting the heterodox view that a soul that commits a great crime is
brought to the underworld even before the death of the body (the
animating spirit of the body is replaced by a demonic one)—a notion
that suggests that an ethos that renders one capable of committing an
extreme crime also may render one incapable of repentance (albeit for
a different reason than in the case of suicide). And even though the
literal significance of this view probably cannot be made consistent with
the understanding of free will that Dante articulates in later cantos,
such a view powerfully expresses Dante’s allegorical concern with the
moral consequences of the destruction of right reason.
What is also striking about this philosophy is how decisive its apparent
reversal of the traditional understanding of the respective importance
of ethics and metaphysics is. Indeed, if Gilson is right, Dante all but
abandons metaphysics in light of the inherent weakness of human in-
tellect without the intercession of grace. Gilson writes: “The thesis which
Dante here maintains is quite extraordinary for the Middle Ages. Taken
literally, it amounts to the maintenance of the primacy of ethics over
metaphysics” (105). With respect to the authority of theology, the in-
herent unreliability of metaphysics can only be compensated for by the
assurance that revelation may act as a guide with respect to human
spiritual ends. But with respect to temporal beatitude, neither revelation
nor metaphysics appear to have any special prerogative.
Perhaps as a consequence of this apparent reversal, then, Dante’s
political theory continually stresses the necessity and the expediency of
temporal authority’s independence from spiritual authority. Purgatorio
16 expresses Dante’s argument succinctly. Here, in a canto very near to
the literal center of the entire Commedia, the pilgrim begs a Lombard,
Marco, to point out the cause of the world’s having become “totally
deserted of any virtues . . . gravid and covered with malice” (tutto dis-
erto d’ogne virtute . . . e di malizia gravido e coverto) (Purg. 16.58–
60). To this Marco responds that the fault lies not in the heavens, not
in that “greater power and better nature” (maggior forza e . . . miglior
natura) (Purg. 16.79), to which humans are subject, for
“Se cosı` fosse, in voi fora distrutto
libero arbitrio, e non fora giustizia
per ben letizia, e per male aver lutto.”31
31 “‘If it were so, in you would be destroyed free will, and it would not be justice to have
joy for good and mourning for evil’” (Purg. 16.70–73).
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Rather, Marco explains,
“Ben puoi veder che la mala condotta
e` la cagion che ’l mondo ha fatto reo,
e non natura che ’n voi sia corrotta.”32
As a consequence of this focus on the necessity of a temporal political
authority, it should not be a surprise that Dante’s political philosophy
draws upon some Aristotelian premises. First, Dante accepts the Aris-
totelian premise that the human being is a political animal by nature,
and so, according to him, at least part of human happiness must be
found in earthly existence and living in political communities. In ad-
dition, Dante accepts the Aristotelian premises that human appetite is
not naturally well regulated, that education and just laws are necessary
for regulating human appetites, and that excesses of appetite resulting
from a lack of just laws are the seeds of social disturbance, strife, and
war. But drawing upon these premises, Dante departs entirely from Ar-
istotle in the conclusion that the form of government best equipped to
cultivate ethical virtue in the citizens is a universal monarchy:
Consequently, in order to do away with these wars and their causes, it is necessary
that the whole earth, and all that is given to the human race to possess, should
be a Monarchy—that is, a single principality, having one prince who, possessing
all things and being unable to desire anything else, would keep the kings content
within the boundaries of their kingdoms and preserve among them the peace
in which the cities might rest. Through this peace the communities would come
to love one another, and by this love all households would provide for their
needs, which when provided would bring man happiness, for this is the end for
which he is born.33
32 “‘You can well see that bad leadership is the cause that has made the world rotten, and
not nature that in you is corrupt’” (Purg. 16.103–5).
33 “Il perche´, a queste guerre e alle loro cagioni to`rre via, conviene di necessitade tutta la
terra, e quanto all’umana generazione a possedere e` dato, essere Monarchia, cioe` uno solo
principato, e uno prencipe avere; lo quale, tutto possedendo e piu` desiderare non possendo,
li regi tegna contenti nelli termini delli regni, sı` che pace intra loro sia, nella quale si posino
le cittadi, e in questa posa le vicinanze s’amino, [e] in questo amore le case prendano ogni
loro bisogno, lo qual preso, l’uomo viva felicemente: che e` quello per che esso e` nato” (Conv.
4.4). It seems likely that Dante implicitly embraced the obvious corollary that imperial own-
ership of all material goods would leave the church bereft of any property. However, it is not
clear that Dante drew the conclusion that total ownership of material wealth would amount
to the same thing as living fully in accordance with a vow of poverty, for in each case attachment
to material goods would have no power over the soul (though, even in the case of a vow of
absolute poverty, I suppose the temptation to pursue material goods would remain). However,
just as Dante rarely addresses the practicalities of universal monarchy (e.g., how election and
succession were to be handled), it is not clear to me that Dante ever explored or understood
other ramifications of his argument for the imperial ownership of all material goods.
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It is not entirely clear whether Dante is aware of how far this notion
departs from Aristotle. The line following those quoted above suggests
that Dante believes his understanding coincides with Aristotle’s: “Con-
firmation of this line of reasoning can be found in what the Philosopher
says in the Politics: in a plurality directed to one end, one member must
direct and rule, and all the others must be ruled and directed.”34 Com-
menting on this passage in his translation of the text, Christopher Ryan
notes that “[Dante’s] language here, with its reference to a plurality
directed to one end, suggests that he took this reference to the Politics from
the opening words of Aquinas’ introduction to his commentary on Ar-
istotle’s Metaphysics.”35 But that Dante, who is generally reluctant to dis-
agree with Aristotle on matters of ethics, should depart so dramatically
from Aristotle on matters of politics would not be surprising in light of
the possibility that Dante was not directly familiar with the Politics. Ac-
cording to Gilson, “it is not certain” (218 n. 1) that Dante did read the
Politics, and he may have derived most of his citations of it from other
sources, including Thomas and Egidio Colonna.36 In any case, Gilson
correctly observes that “Aristotle could in no way help the author of the
Monarchy to solve a problem which could not arise in a Greek civilization
[the problem of the relationship between secular authority and universal
papal authority]. Even if Dante read Aristotle’s Politics . . . it could not
have dictated his answer to the problem he set for himself” (218).
This difference between the contexts in which Dante’s and Aristotle’s
political theories are articulated is crucial. While both are concerned
in general with the elimination of excessive appetite and other causes
of political conflict (for Aristotle, see esp. Politics 4.1–4), their notions
of the proper scope of a political community differ entirely. For Aris-
totle, the very idea of a universal political constitution would likely be
almost as incomprehensible as the notion of a universal (and mono-
theistic) church, while, for Dante, the premise (or endoxa) that the
Catholic church is indeed a universal church is so entrenched that he
in fact seems implicitly to rely on it to draw the conclusion (even if
unusual in his own day) that the corresponding authority in temporal
matters would also have to be both independent and universal. Specif-
ically, for Dante, if an emperor is indeed to be a universal temporal
34 “E a queste ragioni si possono reducere parole del Filosofo ch’elli nella Politica dice, che
quando piu` cose ad uno fine sono ordinate, una di quelle conviene essere regolante o vero
reggente, e tutte l’altre rette e regolate” (Conv. 4.4.5).
35 Christopher Ryan, Dante: The Banquet (Saratoga, CA: Stanford French and Italian Studies,
Amna Libri, 1989).
36 Gilson’s tentative assessment is upheld in more recent discussions as well; see, e.g., Scott,
Understanding Dante, 152.
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authority, then the emperor must also, with respect to temporal au-
thority, rule without interference from any of the representatives of
spiritual authority. Certainly, as an individual human, the emperor is
subject to the pope’s guidance in order to attain the spiritual end pos-
sible for all humans (or at least for Christian ones37), but in relation to
its own office, the emperor’s authority is independent of the pope’s.
In light of this conception of the independence of the temporal au-
thority of the universal emperor from the spiritual authority of the
universal pope, it is possible to understand Marco’s tone of contempt
in Purgatorio 16. For, as Marco asks, “the laws are there, but who executes
them?” (le leggi son, ma chi pon mano ad esse?) (Purg. 16.97). This is
obviously a rhetorical question. No one who has read the final canto of
Inferno can have missed the fact that the greatest sins—Lucifer’s and
Judas’s attempts directly to usurp or undermine God’s authority—are
most nearly matched only by those of Brutus and Cassius, who attempted
to usurp the authority of the supreme earthly monarch by assassinating
Caesar. In short, the utmost political problem for Dante lies in main-
taining the independence of the emperor’s temporal authority and the
pope’s spiritual authority. Any encroachment of one sovereign power
upon the authority of the other is bound to result both in undermining
the possibilities of spiritual redemption and in preventing the very pos-
sibility of justice and human happiness on earth. As Marco states,
“Soleva Roma, che ’l buon mondo feo,
due soli aver, che l’una e l’altra strada
facean vedere, e del mondo e di Deo.”38
But, by Dante’s time,
“L’un l’altro ha spento, ed e` giunta la spade
col pasturale, e l’un con l’altro insieme
per viva forza mal convien che vada
pero` che, giunti, l’un l’altro non teme.”39
In fact, Dante probably intended these lines from the Purgatorio to
be a more forceful version of an argument offered rhetorically in Mon-
archia to discredit papal uses of an allegorical interpretation of the
37 For Dante’s own exceptions to this rule, see Purg. 1–2 (Cato) and Par. 20 (Ripheus and
Trajan).
38 “‘Rome, which made the good world, had two suns that made visible the one road and
the other, of the world and of God’” (Purg. 16.106–8).
39 “‘The one has extinguished the other, and the sword is joined to the shepherd’s staff,
and entirely forcing the one together with the other goes badly, for, joined, the one does
not fear the other’” (Purg. 16.109–12).
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creation of the sun and the moon in order to denigrate the indepen-
dence of imperial authority. The entirety of Monarchia 3.4 is devoted to
this purpose, but in relation to the two suns mentioned in Marco’s
argument, Dante’s self-avowedly eristic argument is especially worth not-
ing:
This argument can also be refuted, if we tolerate the false premiss, by making
a distinction; for a refutation based on a distinction is kinder to one’s adversary,
in that he does not appear to be asserting an outright falsehood, as a refutation
based on demolishing his premiss makes him appear to do. I therefore say that
although the moon does not have light in abundance except in so far as it
receives it from the sun, it does not follow from this that the moon derives from
the sun. For it must be grasped that the moon’s existence is one thing, its power
another, and its function another again. . . . Thus I say that the temporal realm
does not owe its existence to the spiritual realm, nor its power (which is its
authority), and not even its function in an absolute sense; but it does receive
from it the capacity to operate more efficaciously through the light of grace
which in heaven and on earth the blessing of the supreme Pontiff infuses into
it.40
In light of the fact that the Commedia’s argument in this context ap-
pears to be more forceful than that of the Monarchia, it is easy to un-
derstand the contempt Dante directs in the Commedia toward popes such
as Boniface VIII.41 But in both texts, Dante’s fundamental argument is
that respect is owed to a pope only insofar as he is pope and to an
emperor only insofar as he is emperor. On behalf of the human need
for temporal laws to regulate the passions and make possible the very
spiritual beatitude with which a pope ought to be concerned, Dante
offers a sharp reproach of any pope whose own human cupiditas42 would
lead him to usurp earthly power and unjustly trespass upon the office
of the emperor.
40 “Potest etiam hoc, mendacio tollerando, per distinctionem dissolvi: mitior nanque est in
adversarium solutio distinctiva; non enim omnino mentiens esse videtur, sicut interemptiva
illum videri facit. Dico ergo quod licet luna non habeat lucem habundanter nisi ut a sole
recipit, non propter hoc sequitur quod ipsa luna sit a sole. Unde sciendum quod aliud est
esse ipsius lune, aliud virtus eius, et aliud operari. . . . Sic ergo dico quod regnum temporale
non recipit esse a spirituali, nec virtutem que est eius auctoritas, nec etiam operationem
simpliciter; sed bene ab eo recipit ut virtuosius operetur per lucem gratie quam in celo et
in terra benedictio summi Pontificis infundit illi” (Mon. 3.4.17–20).
41 Indeed Dante’s contempt for the corruption of the Church is so fundamental to the
point of the Commedia that Beatrice’s last speech is devoted to this theme (see Par. 30.128–
48).
42 In English translations of the Monarchia, the term cupiditas is often translated—as Shaw
does—by “greed.” However, since “greed” also translates avaritia—which is merely a variety
of excessive cupiditas—it seems better to translate cupiditas by “cupidity,” even at the expense
of missing some of its connotations. Cupiditas is also commonly (though not unanimously)
interpreted as symbolized by the wolf that blocks the pilgrim’s way in Inf. 1.49–51.
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This understanding of the limitations on papal authority is also of a
piece with how, in a different context, Dante defines the limits of the
emperor’s authority:
There are other laws which in a sense follow from the forces of nature, such as
determining at what age a man is sufficiently prepared to manage his own affairs,
and in these we are not entirely subject. There are many others which seem to
be associated with the art of imperial rule, and anyone believing the imperial
judgment in such matters to be authoritative was, and still is, deceived. For
example, regarding the definitions of maturity and of nobility, the imperial
judgment cannot compel assent simply by virtue of the fact that he is Emperor.
Therefore let us render unto God that which belongs to God. Consequently we
need not submit or assent to the Emperor Nero, who said that maturity is beauty
and physical strength, but to him who said that maturity is the pinnacle of the
natural life, and that would be the Philosopher [Aristotle].43
Significantly, this passage from Convivio, especially when read in light
of Thomas’s discussion of Solomon’s regal prudence in Par. 10 and 13,
exposes why it is perhaps more accurate to say that Dante’s political
philosophy demands an equilibrium between not two but three forms
of authority, each sovereign in its own realm and each necessary for the
full realization of the two ends of man. These three authorities, as ex-
trapolated from the passage cited above, would now have to be under-
stood as pertaining to (a) spiritual or theological authority, (b) temporal
political authority, and (c) temporal philosophical or didactic authority.
As regards the relationships among these authorities, theology, spiritual
writings, and the effective shepherding by a universal pope together
constitute the single authority necessary for guiding the cultivation of
the theological virtues that are, in turn, necessary for securing the ul-
timate, eternal beatitude of the individual soul. But theology, while the
highest of the sciences in dignity,44 requires the prior cultivation of the
43 “Altre leggi sono che sono quasi seguitatrici di natura, sı` com’e` constituire l’uomo d’etade
sufficiente a ministrare, e di queste non semo in tutto subietti. Altre molte sono, che paiono
avere alcuna parentela coll’arte imperiale—e qui fu ingannato ed e` chi crede che la sentenza
imperiale sia in questa parte autentica—: sı` come [diffinire di] giovinezza e gentilezza, sovra
le quali nullo imperiale giudicio e` da consentire in quanto elli e` imperadore: pero` quello
che e` di [Cesare sia renduto a Cesare, e quello che e` di] Dio sia renduto a Dio. Onde non
e` da credere ne´ da consentire a Nerone imperadore, che disse che giovinezza era bellezza e
fortezza del corpo, ma a colui che dicesse che giovinezza e` colmo della naturale vita, che
sarebbe filosofo” (Conv. 4.9.15–16).
44 Although Gilson was correct to observe that Dante’s understanding of the order of the
sciences differs somewhat from Thomas’s, it should be clear that Dante’s view is generally
consistent not only with Thomas’s view in Summa theologica I,1 that theology is the highest
science but also that, because it cannot be rooted empirically, it is not a science in the same
sense in which other sciences are.
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temporal beatitude associated with the wisdom that Solomon had
requested.
However, despite these various ways in which Dante makes clear his
view of philosophy’s specific role in the cultivation of both the temporal
and supernatural ends of human existence, it cannot be denied that
Dante nevertheless also believes that philosophy is an impotent authority
where there are no extrinsic reins on the appetites of the citizens, for
“human cupidity” would cast aside spiritual aims as well as the natural
aims “made known to us wholly by the philosophers through human
reason . . . unless men, like horses, wandering astray in their bestiality,
were held in check on their path ‘by bit and bridle’” (Monarchia, 3.16).45
Or as Marco puts it,
“Esce di mano a lui che la vagheggia
prima che sia, a guisa di fanciulla
che piangendo e ridendo pargoleggia,
l’anima semplicetta che sa nulla,
salvo che, mossa da lieto fattore,
volontier torna a cio` che la trastulla.
Di picciol bene in pria sente sapore;
quivi s’inganna, e dietro ad esso corre,
se guida o fren non torce suo amore.
Onde convenne legge per fren porre;
convenne rege aver, che discernesse
de la vera cittade almen la torre.”46
45 “Licet ostensa sint nobis hec ab humana ratione que per phylosophos tota nobis innotuit
. . . humana cupiditas postergaret nisi homines, tanquam equi, sua bestialitate vagantes ‘in
camo et freno’ compescerentur in via.” As it relates to the discussion of the need of laws to
regulate human appetites, the “bit and bridle” metaphor occurs frequently in Dante’s writings.
Kay identifies occurrences of this metaphor in Conv. 4.9 and 4.26 as well as in Purg. 6.88–89,
13.40, and 14.143 and suggests that they may derive from James 3:2 or Psalms 31:9 (Dante’s
Monarchia, ed. and trans. Richard Kay [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies,
1998], 315 n. 16). Cassell, perhaps following Kay’s notes, also emphasizes in the notes to his
translation of this passage in Monarchia that Dante employs the metaphor in Purgatorio 13
and 16 (quoted below) and that these are also likely an allusion to Psalms 31:9 (The “Monarchia”
Controversy: An Historical Study with Accompanying Translations of Dante Alighieri’s “Monarchia,”
Guido Vernani’s “Refutation of the ‘Monarchia’ Composed by Dante,” and Pope John XXII’s Bull “Si
fratrum,” ed. and trans. Anthony Cassell [Washington, DC: Catholic University of America
Press, 2004], 339 n. 439). Indeed, the Italian terms il freno or lo fren (obviously derived from
the same term for “reins” in the Latin passage above) occur twice in Inferno (17.106–8, 26.19–
21), once in Paradiso (7.25–27), and no fewer than eleven times in Purgatorio (5.40–42, 6.88–
90, 10.76–78, 14.145–47, 16.91–96 [twice], 20.55–57, 22.19–21, 25.118–20, 28.70–72, 33.139–
41).
46 “‘From the hand of him that first contemplated it, like a little girl who weeps and laughs
effortlessly comes forth the simple little soul, which knows nothing except that, moved by a
happy maker, it willingly turns to that which amuses it. Of a lesser good it first tastes; there
it is deceived and runs after it, if a guide or a rein does not curb its love. Therefore it was
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Thus, according to Dante, good governance, provided only by a uni-
versal monarch, in fact is the very thing that makes it possible for phi-
losophy and theology to guide human beings effectively. It provides the
civil peace necessary for the cultivation of ethical virtue as well as for
the possibility of receiving divine grace through attentiveness to one’s
spiritual ends: ”And since none can reach this harbour (or few, and
these few with great difficulty) unless the waves of seductive greed are
calmed and the human race rests free in the tranquility of peace, this
is the goal which the protector of the world, who is called the Roman
Prince, must strive with all his might to bring about: i.e. that life on
this threshing-floor of mortals may be lived freely and in peace.”47
Accordingly, where Purg. 16.91–96 asserts that either an intrinsic guide
or extrinsic reins are necessary to turn human appetite away from base
pleasures so that it may be genuinely happy, the extrinsic “reins” would
be the laws, whereas the intrinsic “guide” would be philosophy as ethics,
or, to coin a term, philophronesis.48 Dante thus explicitly acknowledges
the necessity of a unification of philosophical and political authority in
Conv. 4:
[Aristotle’s] authority is not opposed to the imperial authority; but the latter
authority without the former creates a danger, and the former authority without
the latter creates a weakness, not inherently, but as a result of the lack of
harmony among the people. When the one is united with the other they are
of the greatest utility and possess the most complete power. Therefore it is
written in the book of Wisdom, “Love the light of wisdom, all you who are before
the people,” which is to say, “Let the philosophic be united with the imperial
authority, for good and perfect government.”49
necessary to set the law as a rein; it was necessary to have a king that could discern at least
the tower of the true city’” (Purg. 16.85–96).
47 “Et cum ad hunc portum vel nulli vel pauci, et hii cum difficultate nimia, pervenire
possint, nisi sedatis fluctibus blande cupiditatis genus humanum liberum in pacis tranquillitate
quiescat, hoc est illud signum ad quod maxime debet intendere curator orbis, qui dicitur
romanus Princeps, ut scilicet in areola ista mortalium libere cum pace vivatur” (Mon. 3.16.11;
cf. Par. 22.151). It seems significant that Dante relies upon the metaphor of a harbor both
in describing Ulysses’s mad flight and again in Par. 13.136–38. For a discussion of Paradiso’s
allusion to Ulysses at this juncture, see Courtney Cahill, “The Limitations of Difference in
Paradiso XIII’s Two Arts: Reason and Poetry,” Dante Studies 114 (1996): 245–69. There is also
a similar use of this image in Conv. 4.28.7.
48 There is always a risk in coining terms. In this case, one risk is that the Latin appropriation
of the term phronesis under the term prudentia may not fully capture the nuances of the
original; by the same token, phronesis, which some translators render simply as “thoughtful-
ness,” hardly conveys the Christian moral sentiment (that Dante would wish to retain) of
prudentia.
49 “E non repugna [la filosofica] autoritade alla imperiale; ma quella sanza questa e` peri-
colosa, e questa sanza quella e` quasi debile, non per se´ ma per la disordinanza della gente:
sı` che l’una coll’altra congiunta utilissime e pienissime sono d’ogni vigore. E pero` si scrive
in quello di Sapienza: ‘Amate lo lume della sapienza, voi tutti che siete dinanzi a’ populi,’
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And yet, even if philosophy is impotent without the rule of law, with
respect to philosophy’s authority, notice that Dante does not just say
that we should respect Aristotle; rather, he insists that we submit to or,
in other words, obey him (see especially the sections preceding those
cited above from Conv. 4.6). In short, philosophy’s authority may be
subordinate to theology’s, but philosophy remains for Dante the highest
authority in temporal matters, and without its guidance neither of the
human ends would be attainable.
These conclusions are supported by even a cursory examination of
Dante’s depiction of those in Limbo who inhabit what is usually inter-
preted as Dante’s depiction of the Elysian Fields. Of prime significance
is that Dante here depicts Aristotle as enthroned, as it were (he may be
sitting on the grass, but the pilgrim has to lift his brow to see him), so
that “tutti lo miran, tutti onor li fanno” (Inf. 4.133). And, it might also
be noted in this context that, among the political leaders Dante names,
the only one to have lived after the death of Christ is Saladin, the Kurdish
Muslim ruler who acquired a reputation for honor and civility even in
defeating the Second Crusade. That Saladin remains in Limbo indicates,
that he, like Averroes and Avicenna, is cut off from spiritual beatitude
not by moral defect or lack of any of the cardinal virtues, but because
of a lack of even implicit faith in Christian doctrine. Thus, Dante seems
to intend for Saladin to represent a political ruler exemplifying the
virtues of a supreme temporal authority insofar as its duties are limited
only to secular concerns.
In sum, then, the regal prudence of Solomon is the embodiment of
the unification of political and philosophical authority. Moreover, this
regal prudence derives its authority from the same providential archi-
tecture that unifies the two ends of human nature. However, while Dante
maintains that both temporal and spiritual authority depend ultimately
on this providential unification of the two human beatitudes, in its
extrinsic sense the law need make no reference to spiritual ends to fulfill
its purpose in this providential architecture of the cosmos. Instead, the
law need only be guided by the right reason of philosophy to make
possible a temporal happiness which, in turn, best prepares citizens to
attend to their spiritual needs. Or, put differently, Saladin himself may
not be saved, but insofar as he had followed the guidance of philosophy’s
authority, he is to be esteemed for the same regal prudence possessed
in the highest degree by Solomon. Moreover, in executing laws that
would have cultivated human temporal needs, Saladin—entirely unlike
Dante’s depiction of Ulysses—is even to be praised for having made it
cioe` a dire: congiungasi la filosofica autoritade colla imperiale, a bene e perfettamente reg-
gere” (Conv. 4.6.17–18).
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more likely that, despite his own spiritual deficiency, his subjects would
then have been equipped to turn to their own spiritual needs by seeking
appropriate guides in the spiritual realm of human activities.
the relationship between philosophy and theology: la donna
gentile and beatrice reconsidered
At this point, it should be clear that there is a deep ambivalence in
Dante’s thinking, and this ambivalence may be to blame (or to credit)
for the rivers of ink poured over the question of Beatrice’s rebuke. On
the one hand, I have shown above that Dante seems to argue for the
independence of not just two, but three authorities—spiritual, ethical,
and political—and that the legitimacy of each of these authorities is
rooted in a psychology involving two independent (but related) human
beatitudes. On the other hand, I have also argued that, in order to avoid
the danger that these forms of authority will conflict with and contin-
ually undermine each other, Dante recognizes that he must demonstrate
their agreement according to a conception of the underlying unity of
the two ends of human nature, and in this, as we have seen, Dante’s
conception of the independent authorities pertinent to the two ends
of human activities departs radically from Aristotle’s ethico-political
theory.
In order to better appreciate how what I am calling an “ambivalence”
in this respect also fruitfully discloses Dante’s fundamental understand-
ing of the relationship between philosophy and theology, it will be help-
ful to return to the poetic symbols discussed briefly at the beginning of
this paper. In this regard I must first note that I agree with the majority
of commentators that the Commedia nowhere supports the conclusion
that devotion to philosophy, represented as devotion to la donna gentile,
secures a happiness wholly independent of the happiness secured
through the devotion to theology, represented by Dante’s devotion to
Beatrice. In the first place, even as early as Inferno 2, Dante makes clear
that it is Beatrice, not Lady Philosophy or la donna gentile, who intercedes
in order to rescue the pilgrim from the state of sin that constitutes the
dark woods in which the straight way was lost. Admittedly, it is through
Virgil—who, “as herald of the Empire in the Comedy,”50 may be read as
a substitute for la donna gentile—that Beatrice’s initial intercession is
accomplished. However, in the second place, that the woods are con-
stituted by a state of sin suggests that the pilgrim’s vices are not simply
50 John Scott, “Canto XVI: A World of Darkness and Disorder,” in Purgatorio: A Canto-by-
Canto Commentary, ed. Allen Mandelbaum, Anthony Oldcorn, and Charles Ross, Lectura Dantis
2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 171.
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contrary to the activities associated with earthly happiness but are also
an affront to the divine providence that, as Marco Lombardo put it, has
ordained a “greater power and better nature” for human souls. This
could not be more at odds with Aristotle’s explicitly stated understand-
ing that although good and bad are not by nature, neither are they
contrary to nature (Nicomachean Ethics B.1, 1103a24–25). And yet, that
Dante held such a view on the nature of sin is continually reinforced
by the speeches he writes for the souls that the pilgrim encounters in
both Hell and Purgatory. Indeed, the very difference between the subject
matters of the Inferno and the Purgatorio attests to this since the souls
that inhabit Purgatorio differ from those of the Inferno not so much in
the severity of their sins and the consequent corruption of their intel-
lectual capacities but by virtue of the fact that the former repented
through an act of will whereas the latter did not (otherwise Virgil would
be more likely to be saved than Statius). Thus, in short, Dante’s fun-
damental view will always tend toward the notion of Beatrice as his main
intercessor and la donna gentile as a secondary or even ancillary one.
However, I cannot agree with those interpreters who maintain that
Beatrice’s rebukes in Purgatorio 30–31 (or that of Cato in Purgatorio 2)
are intended to chastise the pilgrim for his devotion to la donna gentile.
That is, even if Beatrice does rebuke the pilgrim for an excessive at-
tachment to worldly goods and in so doing also implicates any attach-
ment to excessive devotion to pseudophilosophical activities, this does
not persuade me that she is targeting devotion to philosophy as it is
generally depicted in the Convivio. In the first place, as Scott points out,
in Paradiso 27 Beatrice even reiterates the fundamental insights of
Dante’s political philosophy and its insistence on the providential jus-
tification for the independence of temporal rule:
“Pensa che ’n terra non e` che governi;
Onde sı` svı¨a l’umana famiglia.”51
In other words, Beatrice implicitly endorses the general views offered
in Dante’s three philosophical treatises. Moreover, I believe that in none
of Dante’s works can be found any suggestion that philosophy (whether
associated with contemplative or practical activities) ought to be a sub-
stitute for theology, so it is not clear to me why so many interpreters
have claimed that Beatrice rebukes and therefore expresses Dante’s own
repudiation of the philosophical insights of his earlier texts. Rather, I
think it cannot be doubted that Dante always maintained—and explicitly
51 “‘Consider that on earth there is not one who governs; therefore, the human family
strays’” (Par. 27.140–41); see Scott, Understanding Dante, 205).
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in his postexile writings—that philosophy paves the way for theology.
Consequently, even if Dante repudiated some specific aspects of his
earlier works (e.g., Convivio’s theory about moonspots in 2.8.9 is ex-
plicitly rejected in Par. 2), he nowhere repudiates these works tout court,
nor does he repudiate their basic attitudes about philosophy and its
subordination to theology.
However, rather than review all of the literature on this question, in
order to demonstrate my own conclusions I will confine myself to a brief
discussion of how my view differs only from that of Gilson, an eminent
authority whose fundamental impulse I share and whose scholarship is
beyond reproach. In Gilson’s view, there is no contradiction whatsoever
between Dante’s various texts regarding his conception of the relation-
ship between philosophy and theology, and to this extent, I agree with
Gilson. To appreciate the accusation Dante levels against himself even
in La vita nuova for his base attachment to la donna gentile, one must
understand that Dante’s error is not in loving la donna gentile but in
substituting the love of earthly wisdom that she represents for the love
of a heavenly being who aids a spiritual aim. But, by the same token,
Gilson claims, had Dante subordinated the love of la donna gentile to his
passion for Beatrice, he would merely have committed the opposite
error. In short, Gilson’s interpretation is that la donna gentile is no more
a handmaid to Beatrice than philosophy is to theology. Thus, according
to Gilson, understanding why, for Dante, the passions for la donna gentile
and Beatrice must remain autonomous within their respective spheres
of influence provides a key insight regarding Dante’s arguments for the
independence of the respective realms of temporal and spiritual au-
thority. Put briefly, Gilson’s point is that Dante’s arguments about tem-
poral and spiritual authority hinge on an understanding of the inde-
pendence of philosophy from theology.
Gilson’s view that devotion to la donna gentile is not merely ancillary
to the devotion owed to Beatrice would even seem to be consistent with
Marco’s point that the two suns of Rome are both infused by the same
light. According to such an interpretation, it would also therefore seem
that philosophy has an independent power and authority to move the
soul even though it may derive its light from the same source that also
leads to a spiritual perfection. However, I think that Dante’s reflections
on Solomon’s regal prudence show why Gilson ultimately goes too far
in asserting the fundamental independence of philosophy from theol-
ogy in Dante’s thinking. In fact, the ground for the independence of
temporal and spiritual authority is to be found in a shared providential
architecture in which temporal authority no less than spiritual authority
derives from the historical unfolding of divine justice in the world:
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Since the disposition of this world is a result of the disposition inherent in the
circling of the heavens, in order that useful teachings concerning freedom and
peace can be applied appropriately to times and places, it is necessary for pro-
vision for this protector to be made by Him who takes in at a glance the whole
disposition of the heavens, for he alone is the one who preordained this dis-
position, making provision through it to bind all things in due order. If this is
so, then God alone chooses, he alone confirms, since he has none above him.
Thus it is evident then that the authority of the temporal monarch flows down
into him without any intermediary from the Fountainhead of universal authority.52
Thus, while philosophy may indeed have legitimate grounds for guid-
ing the soul independently of theological authority, ultimately its pur-
pose in supplying this independent guidance must remain subordinate
to the higher aim of human activity. Or, put differently, while philos-
ophy’s authority must remain independent from that of theology with
respect to its capacity to guide humans to its earthly beatitude, this
earthly beatitude is itself subordinate to the higher spiritual beatitude.
So, in short, contrary to Gilson’s interpretation, I think we are forced
to conclude that Dante does indeed subordinate philosophy to theology,
though, nodding in agreement with Gilson, not because Dante in any
way denigrates philosophy’s independent power to move the soul or its
importance in leading human beings to both forms of beatitude.
First, even in Convivio, the work in which Dante is least ambivalent
in his praise of la donna gentile, Dante appears to suggest that devotion
to la donna gentile presents a threat to the proper and primary devotion
owed to Beatrice, though perhaps not to the same degree or for the
same reasons as offered in La vita nuova. This concern is raised, for
instance, in Conv. 2.12:
I could not imagine her in any attitude except one of compassion, so that the
part of my mind that perceives truth gazed on her so willingly that I could
barely turn it away from her. I began to go where she was truly revealed, namely
to the schools of the religious orders and to the disputations held by the phi-
losophers, so that in a short period of time, perhaps some thirty months, I
began to feel her sweetness so much that the love of her dispelled and destroyed
every other thought.53
52 “Cumque dispositio mundi huius dispositionem inherentem celorum circulationi sequa-
tur, necesse est ad hoc ut utilia documenta libertatis et pacis commode locis et temporibus
applicentur, de curatore isto dispensari ab Illo qui totalem celorum dispositionem presen-
tialiter intuetur. Hic autem est solus ille qui hanc preordinavit, ut per ipsam ipse providens
suis ordinibus queque connecteret. Quod si ita est, solus eligit Deus, solus ipse confirmat,
cum superiorem non habeat. . . . Sic ergo patet quod auctoritas temporalis Monarche sine
ullo medio in ipsum de Fonte universalis auctoritatis descendit” (Mon. 3.16.12–15).
53 Emphasis added to translation. “Non la poteva imaginare in atto alcuno se non miseri-
cordioso; per che sı` volentieri lo senso di vero la mirava, che appena lo potea volgere da
quella. E da questo imaginare cominciai ad andare la` dov’ella si dimostrava veracemente,
The Journal of Religion
184
I will discuss below how I think Dante attends to and indicates a way
to avoid this threat. However, at this point it is worth pausing to point
out that Dante is here already in Convivio rebuking an excessively pseu-
dophilosophical activity that might also be one of the targets of Beat-
rice’s rebukes in Purgatorio 30 and 31. Yet, if so, far from indicating a
fundamental disagreement between the Commedia and Convivio, Dante’s
own explicit concern with the question of excessive involvement in
pseudo-philosophy indicates instead a fundamental agreement about
not only the proper relationship between philosophy and theology but
also ways in which attachment to the former can be improper or
excessive.
Second, while Gilson’s interpretation suggests that the passions for
la donna gentile and Beatrice are strictly autonomous, Dante’s own dis-
cussion appears to resist this interpretation. For instance, in relation
to the problem of establishing the relationship between the science of
philosophy (as ethics) and that of theology, Gilson explains:
In the article in the Summa theologica in which he explains his view on this point
[I,1,5], St. Thomas too adduces, as the basis of his own thesis, a passage from
the Scriptures, but it is not the same one [Dante chooses]: Misit ancillas suas
vocare ad arcem (“She hath sent her maids to invite to the tower”) (Prov., IX,
3). . . . Dante probably knew this doctrine of St. Thomas and the passage from
Proverbs, but he prefers to quote another: Sexaginta sunt reginae, et octoginta
concubine, et adulescentularum non est numerus: una est columba mea, perfecta mea
(“There are threescore queens, and fourscore concubines, and virgins without
number. My dove, my undefiled, is but one”) (Song of Songs, VI, 8–9). Since he
is made out to be so faithful and well informed a Thomist—and he was at any
rate well informed—Dante undoubtedly did not prefer one Solomon to another
without reason. The fact of the matter is that the symbolism of the passage
chosen by Dante makes theology out to be a pure dove, but not a queen, and
the other sciences queens, not handmaids. This passage from the Song of Songs
therefore illustrates admirably Dante’s idea on the point. (115–16)
Dante’s use of the passage from Song of Songs is to be found in Conv.
2.14, and the term adulescentularum, which Gilson quotes from the Vul-
gate, refers generically to both male and female adolescence. However,
Gilson seems oddly to have ignored the fact that Dante quotes this
passage from Song of Songs not in Latin, but in Italian, and that, in
this, Dante renders the relevant line (my emphasis): “e de le ancille
adolescenti non e` numero.” Later, in interpreting the line, Dante again
uses the Italian term ancille and in fact even drops the term adolescenti.
cioe` nelle scuole delli religiosi e alle disputazioni delli filosofanti; sı` che in picciolo tempo,
forse di trenta mesi, cominciai tanto a sentire della sua dolcezza, che lo suo amore cacciava
e distruggeva ogni altro pensiero” (Conv. 2.12.6–7).
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Indeed, a similar usage is employed in Purg. 31.106–8, where the four
ninfe that represent the cardinal virtues are described as Beatrice’s
“handmaidens” (ancelle), a fact which, in relation to the question of
theology’s handmaids would suggest that Dante’s choice of ancille in
Convivio is not arbitrary. Consequently, Gilson may be correct that Dante
understands the relationship between the sciences differently than
Thomas, but Gilson’s argument that Dante maintained the indepen-
dence of the passions for la donna gentile and Beatrice is clearly weak-
ened by Dante’s own symbolic suggestion in these passages that ethics
is ancillary to theology.
Finally, an attentive analysis of Convivio also shows that, even in the
so-called philosophical treatise, Dante maintains the hierarchical sub-
ordination of purely ethical aims—aims that are entirely within the
purview of philosophy—to theological ones—aims that are to some de-
gree excessive of the legitimate scope of philosophy’s authority. Spe-
cifically, in Conv. 3.15, Dante distinguishes between a primary and a
secondary happiness engendered by devotion to la donna gentile. Here,
in explicating the second canzone, Dante associates the perfection of
the active life—stimulated by the outward beauty of the body of phi-
losophy—with only the secondary form of human happiness:
Then when it [the second canzone] says: Her beauty rains down little flames
of fire, it descends to another joy of Paradise, namely to the happiness secondary
to the primary happiness, which derives from her beauty. Here we must know that
morality is the beauty of Philosophy, for just as the beauty of the body derives
from the degree to which its members are properly ordered, so the beauty of
wisdom, which, as has been said, is the body of Philosophy, derives from the
order of the moral virtues which enable her to give pleasure perceptible to the
senses. Therefore I say that her beauty (that is, morality) rains down flames of
fire (that is, right appetite), which is engendered by the pleasure imparted by
moral teaching, an appetite that removes us from even the natural vices, not
to speak of the others. From this is born that happiness which Aristotle defines
in the first book of the Ethics, where he says that it consists in “acting in
accordance with virtue throughout one’s entire life.”54
54 Emphasis added to translation. “Poi quando dico: ‘Sua bielta` piove fiammelle di foco,’
discendo ad un altro piacere di Paradiso, cioe` della felicitade secondaria a questa prima, la
quale della sua biltade procede. Dove e` da sapere che la moralitade e` bellezza della Filosofia:
che´ cosı` come la bellezza del corpo resulta dalle membra in quanto sono debitamente or-
dinate, cosı` la bellezza della sapienza, che e` corpo di Filosofia come detto e`, resulta dall’ordine
delle vertudi morali, che fanno quella piacere sensibilemente. E pero` dico che sua bielta`,
cioe` moralitade, piove fiammelle di foco, cioe` appetito diritto, che s’ingenera nel piacere
della morale dottrina: lo quale appetito ne diparte eziandio dalli vizii naturali, non che dalli
altri. E quinci nasce quella felicitade la quale diffinisce Aristotile nel primo dell’Etica, dicendo
che e` operazione secondo vertu` in vita perfetta” (Conv. 3.15.11–12).
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In other words, it is true that one of the effects of la donna gentile is
to engender ethical virtue in a way consistent with Dante’s obedience
to Aristotle with regard to temporal beatitude. However, this same quo-
tation also indicates that even the four cardinal virtues of prudence,
justice, fortitude, and temperance are ancillary to the theological virtues
necessary for attaining the greatest and truest form of human happiness.
Thus, when we turn to the question of the way in which the beauty of
la donna gentile’s countenance affects us and makes possible for us a
primary happiness, Dante’s interpretation of the second canzone of the
Convivio articulates the allegorical meaning of the effects of love of la
donna gentile in this way:
The sight of this lady was so generously granted to us in order not only that
we might see her face, which she reveals to us, but that we might desire to
acquire those things which she keeps hidden from us. For just as because of
her much is perceived by our reason, and consequently it becomes compre-
hensible, which without her would seem miraculous, so because of her it be-
comes believable that every miracle can be perceived by a superior intellect to
have a reasonable cause and, consequently, to have the power to exist. Our good
faith has its origin in this, from which comes the hope that longs for things foreseen;
and from this springs the activity of charity. By these three virtues we ascend to
philosophize in that celestial Athens where Stoics and Peripatetics and Epi-
cureans, by the light of eternal truth, join ranks in a single harmonious will.55
Thus, Dante shows how devotion to la donna gentile produces both
temporal and spiritual beatitudes, and we also therefore have an answer
to the possibility raised in both La vita nuova and Purgatorio that one
love may destroy the other. That is, for Dante, the love of la donna gentile
is none other than the love of Beatrice understood under the temporal
aspects involved in the relationships between the two main beati-
tudes—that is, in the production of the virtues necessary for both tem-
poral and spiritual beatitude. To the extent that Beatrice is, in an ab-
solute sense, an authority always pertinent to the pilgrim’s movement
toward the primary beatitude, devotion to her can never be excessive.
But, with respect to devotion to la donna gentile, because the devotion
55 Emphasis added to translation. “Lo sguardo di questa donna fu a noi cosı` largamente
ordinato, non pur per la faccia che ella ne dimostra, vedere, ma per le cose che ne tiene
celate desiderare ad acquistare. Onde, sı` come per lei molto di quello si vede per ragione,
e per consequente si vede poter essere, che sanza lei pare maraviglia, cosı` per lei si crede
ogni miracolo in piu` alto intelletto pote[r] avere ragione, e per consequente pote[r] essere.
Onde la nostra buona fede ha sua origine; dal[la] quale viene la speranza, ch’e` ’l proveduto
desiderare; e per quella nasce l’operazione della caritade. Per le quali tre virtudi si sale a
filosofare a quelle Atene celestiali dove li Stoici e Peripatetici e Epicurıˆ, per la luce della
veritade etterna, in uno volere concordevolemente concorrono” (Conv. 3.14.13–15; see also
Conv. 3.7.15–16).
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produces virtues temporally, it can indeed be excessive insofar as it
remains content with only the secondary, temporal beatitude provided
by the guidance of human reason alone. This is why, to the extent that
one perfects only the temporal happiness associated with secular phil-
osophical activities, Dante allegorically reserves a place in Limbo with
“the master of those who know sitting among a philosophical family”
(il maestro di color che sanno seder tra filosofica famiglia) (Inf. 4.131–
32), who, despite their temporal perfections, are unable to reach any
greater perfection than to live in desire without hope (Inf. 4.42),
or—perhaps more in keeping with Dante’s theology—in “grief without
torture” (duol sanza martı`ri) (Inf. 4.28). In such a situation, one would
also, of course, share the fate of Dante’s Virgil.
Consequently, in general, Dante’s so-called philosophical treatises are
not to be read in light of Beatrice’s rebukes. Rather, as I have argued
above, the same tendencies Beatrice rebukes in the Commedia are al-
ready rebuked in the Convivio (and arguably even in La vita nuova).
Thus, while the Commedia may correct some of the views of the Convivio
regarding angelology and the psychology of love as well as embellish
the providential architecture of the Monarchia, it should nonetheless
be clear that these texts fundamentally agree about the esteem owed
to both Beatrice and la donna gentile. In short, philosophy alone cannot
provide the salvation associated with spiritual beatitude, but Dante’s
considered view in both the Convivio and the Commedia is that Lady
Philosophy always reveals the way forward (whether one would choose
to see beyond mere reason to the light Dante believes she reveals and
how one would follow such a light is another matter).
